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INTRODUCTION 
Expansive public school reform initiatives are being adopted in 
school systems nationwide.
1
 Most of the reform initiatives are aimed 
at improving the public schools attended by predominately poor and 
minority students.
2
 Judicially based reforms are however noticeably 
absent from the reform agenda.
3
 Previously, judicially based reforms 
aimed at desegregating schools
4
 and reforming school finance
5
 were 
the primary mechanisms used to improve educational opportunities 
1. See generally DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION
MOVEMENT AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 9–31 (2013) (discussing and 
critiquing the various local, state and federal based school reform efforts in public education 
over the course of the last decade).  
2. At the federal level in particularly, sweeping legislation aimed at closing achievement 
gaps between minority and poor students and their nonminority and middle class counterparts 
have been a catalyst for reforms implemented at the state and local level. See, e.g., The No 
Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6301(3) (2006) (noting that one purpose of the No Child 
Left Behind Act is “closing the achievement gap between high- and low-performing children, 
especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between 
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers”); The Race to the Top Initiative, Pub. 
L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 284 (2009) (enacted as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Race to the Top initiative is a competitive grant program that 
provides grants to states that, among other things, implement education reforms, close 
achievement gaps, and increase high school graduation rates).
3. See, e.g., Derek Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools and Lessons to Be Learned, 64
FL. L. REV. 1723, 1731–38 (2012) (noting the decline in court orders that address racial 
segregation, poverty, disability and language access) [hereinafter Black, Civil Rights]; Erika K. 
Wilson, Gentrification and Urban Public School Reforms: The Interest Divergence Dilemma, 
118 W. VA. L. REV. 101, 125 (2015) (arguing that “those looking to improve urban public 
schools are now more likely to look outside of the federal or state judiciary”) [hereinafter 
Wilson, Gentrification]. 
4. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of 
New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 
1 (1971).  
5. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano v.
Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).  
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for poor and minority students.
6
 However, the more recent public 
school reform initiatives largely rest upon free-market based tools 
such as charter schools, vouchers, and district wide school choice 
programs.
7
 While judicially based reform efforts center around 
collectively improving public schools for poor and minority students 
as a whole, market-based reforms focus on providing individual 
families and students with the opportunity to improve their own 
educational opportunities. The shift from collectively-based judicial 
reform efforts to individually focused, market-based reforms is 
significant for two reasons. 
First, it suggests that advocates are accepting of a diminished role 
for the judiciary in regulating educational opportunities for poor and 
minority students. The federal judiciary has long been the institution 
“looked upon to remedy issues of racial segregation and inequality” 
in public schools.
8
 However, since at least the 1990s—and some may 
argue even earlier—federal courts have become increasingly hostile 
to court mandated desegregation schemes.
9
 Among other things, the 
Supreme Court imposed an arduous causation standard that requires 
plaintiffs seeking school desegregation orders to show a connection 
between past de jure segregation policies and current school 
segregation in order to prevail.
10
 Plaintiffs often fail to meet this 
6. See supra note 3.
7. The term “free-market tools” is used to mean tools that allow for individual parent and 
student autonomy, flexibility, and choice. See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE, 
POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990) (arguing that the government has failed 
to successfully reform schools because government intervention in schools is the problem and 
advocating for market based school governance that has parental choice as a foundation); 
Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 1083, 1085 (2013) (“In education, racial discrimination and structural inequality are 
increasingly ignored as the education system gives broadened ‘options’ to those it underserves, 
in the form of private schools, charter schools, and voucher programs.”).  
8. Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality Through the No Child Left 
Behind Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 628 (2011) [hereinafter 
Wilson, Leveling Localism].  
9. See, e.g., Black, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 1726 (arguing that “[t]he United States
Supreme Court placed major limitations on desegregation as early as the 1970s and effectively 
ensured its end in the 1990s”).  
10. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decision-Making: School 
Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1646 (2003) (discussing the 
high causation standard in school desegregation cases and noting that “plaintiffs are entitled to 
their ultimate goal in the lawsuit—desegregation to the extent practicable—but only to the 
extent that current segregation is attributable to the defendants”) [hereinafter Parker, Decline]. 
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arduous standard. Instead, courts routinely find that current racial 
segregation in schools is attributable to changing racial demographics 
or housing segregation rather than past de jure school desegregation 
policies.
11
 Consequently, modern day racial segregation in schools 
often escapes judicial scrutiny or intervention.  
Judicial attempts to reform public schools through school finance 
reform have achieved mixed results at best. While some state courts 
are issuing orders finding that state school financing systems violate 
state constitutional provisions regarding a student’s right to an 
education,
12
 the courts tend to take a very limited view of their 
remedial authority. They often decline to order remedies that would 
require state legislatures to make specific budgetary allocations.
13
 
Instead, they emphasize that judicial intervention in the state 
budgeting process is warranted only in very limited circumstances.
14
 
11. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995) (“[E]xternal factors beyond the 
control of the KCMSD and the State affect minority student achievement. So long as these 
external factors are not the result of segregation, they do not figure in the remedial calculus.”); 
Thomas Cnty. Branch of the NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 
1369 (2004) (“While the record in this case establishes that many poor black children in 
Thomasville, Georgia are not receiving what this Court would consider an adequate education, 
the record is clear that Defendant has not engaged in intentional discrimination based upon 
race.”). 
12. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W. 2d 186, 213 (Ky. 1989) 
(finding that Kentucky’s public schools failed to satisfy the state constitutional mandate to 
provide an efficient system of public education); Abbott v. Burke 575 A. 2d 359, 384 (N.J. 
1990) (holding that the poorer urban school districts in New Jersey did not satisfy the state 
constitutional requirement that schools provide students with a thorough and efficient 
education). See generally Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity Hollow Victories and 
the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative 
Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543 (1998).  
13. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E. 2d 50, 57 (N.Y. 2006) 
(reversing the court of appeals directive to the state legislature to calculate the cost of a sound 
basic education for New York public school students reasoning that “[t]he role of the courts is 
not, as Supreme Court assumed, to determine the best way to calculate the cost of a sound basic 
education in New York City schools, but to determine whether the State’s proposed calculation 
of that cost is rational”); Hancock v. Commissioner of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005) 
(refusing to order a study to assess actual costs of effective implementation of educational 
programs intended to provide an adequate education in focus public school districts and, 
therefore, finding that the state was not violating the Massachusetts education clause by not 
providing an adequate education to students). 
14. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E. 2d at 56 (“Judicial intervention 
in the state budget ‘may be invoked only in the narrowest of instances’.”); Neely v. West-
Orange Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 785 (Tex. 2005) (finding that the 
system of school financing did not violate the education provision of the Texas state 
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As a result, state legislatures are often left with wide discretion to 
craft funding schemes, and all too often those schemes are 
insufficient at remedying funding disparities and inadequacies.
15
  
Second, the shift from court-based to market-based reforms 
demonstrates a structural change in our conceptualization of the 
purpose of public education. From the inception of public education 
in America, the states’ primary justification for providing free 
education to its citizenry was to produce a robust, literate citizenry 
that was not only capable of earning a living, but more importantly, 
capable of contributing to and participating in the American 
democracy.
16
 Market-based school reforms such as charter schools, 
vouchers, and some school choice programs invert that logic by 
allowing individual parents and students with the political capital to 
do so to leave their assigned public school and to attend a public or 
private school that they believe can provide a higher quality 
education. The reforms do nothing to address the state of public 
schools more broadly. Rather than focusing on the collective benefits 
of public education for the citizenry as a whole, market-based 
reforms focus on the ability of particular parents and students to 
control educational opportunities by moving away from failing 
schools to better performing schools.
17
  
This Article critically examines the rise of market-based reforms. 
It argues that market-based reforms result in quality public education 
being normatively conceptualized and treated as what political 
constitution and reasoning that “[i]f the Legislature’s choices are informed by guiding rules and 
principles properly related to public education—that is, if the choices are not arbitrary—then 
the system does not violate the constitutional provision”).  
15. See Laurie Reynolds, Skyboxes Schools: Public Education As Private Luxury, 82 
WASH. U. L.Q. 755, 755 (2004) (arguing that even when state legislature increase funding for 
all public schools, most school funding legislation does not place a cap on how much districts 
can spend on students thereby allowing wealthier districts to continue to drastically outspend 
poorer districts).  
16. See Julie A. Reuben, Patriotic Purposes: Public Schools and the Education of 
Citizens, in THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1, 2–3 (Susan Furham & Marvin Lazersons eds., 2005). 
17. See, e.g., Black, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 1729 (noting that parents who select
charter schools desire self-determination and the power to control their own children’s 
educational interests with little regard for the educational health of the charter school as a whole 
and describing the purposes of government’s involvement in providing public education as 
being for patriotic or democracy building purposes). See infra Part I for a further and more 
thorough discussion of the purposes of public education in America. 
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economists call a private, rather than public, good.
18
 To be clear, this 
Article uses the classic definition of a “public good” to mean a good 
that is “non-excludable” and “non-rivalrous.”19 On the other hand, it 
uses the term “private good” to mean a good that is both excludable 
and rivalrous.
20
  
While public education is admittedly not a pure public good, it is 
widely recognized as a “quasi” or “impure” public good because of 
the ability to exclude people from receiving it.
21
 Quasi or impure 
public goods share some characteristics of a private good, but are still 
considered public goods because there are positive externalities 
associated with the good—such that not all benefits of the good 
accrue solely to the individual, but instead to society as a whole.
22
  
Market-based school reform efforts often diminish public 
education’s ability to truly bring positive externalities to society as a 
whole. They do so by situating the positive externalities associated 
18. Other legal scholars have also written about the ways in which the purpose of public 
education is being skewed due to an influx of market based principles and a trend towards 
privatization. See, e.g., John A. Powell, The Tensions Between Integration and School Reform, 
28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655, 671–80 (2001) (arguing that a reformist agenda based 
principles of choice that are tied to market-based philosophies is taking root and critiquing that 
choice based movement on the grounds that it allows public education to be commodified in 
ways that are harmful to African-American students); Derek W. Black, Charter Schools, 
Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 445, 446 (2013) (suggesting that the 
influx of voucher and charter programs as a vehicle for reforming public schools results in a 
“commodification of education [that] corresponds with our overall cultural shift toward 
individualized, rather than common, experiences”) [hereinafter Black, Charter Schools]. This 
Article adds to and builds upon that prior scholarship.  
19. See Randall G. Holcombe, A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods, 10 REV. 
AUSTRIAN ECON. 1, 1–2 (1997). “[P]ublic good, as defined by economic theory, is a good that, 
once produced, can be consumed by an additional consumer at no additional cost.” Id. Further 
the term “non-excludable” means that it is difficult to keep people from consuming a good once 
it has been produced while the term “non-rivalrous” means that once a good is produced for one 
person, additional consumers can consume at no additional cost. Id.  
20. See Dennis Epple & Richard E. Ramono, Public Provision of Private Goods, 104 J.
POL. ECON. 57 (1996).  
21. John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher 
Education, 104 GEO. L.J. 229, 236 (2016) (“Education is a primary example in the economics 
literature of a ‘quasi-public good’—a good that, although not strictly speaking a nonrivalrous, 
non-excludable classic public good, still has such substantial positive externalities and spillover 
effects as to be within government’s purview.”); Christopher Lubienski, Public Schools in 
Marketized Environments: Shifting Incentives and Unintended Consequences of Competition‐
Based Educational Reforms, 111:4 AM. J. EDUC. 470 (Aug. 2005) (describing public education 
as a quasi-public good.).  
22. See Holcombe, supra note 19; Brooks, supra note 21. 
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with a quality public education
23
 in ways that do not benefit the 
greater society. Instead, they allow a shallow subset of people to take 
advantage of market-like exchanges to select—rather than be 
assigned to—a particular school that they believe will provide a 
quality public education for only them. Little regard is given to the 
overall quality of education received by students collectively. Instead, 
market-based reforms allow students to individually improve their 
own lot, while failing to address systemic issues that plague many 
failing schools. For these reasons, this Article makes a normative 
argument in favor of re-thinking market-based reforms as the primary 
vehicle for improving educational opportunities for poor and minority 
students.  
Part I of the Article examines the decline of federal and state 
courts in effectively regulating educational opportunities for poor and 
minority students. It analyzes the reasons school desegregation and 
school finance cases fell short in their quest to effectively reform 
public schools for those students. Part II chronicles the rise in market-
based reforms. It then argues that the rise in market-based reform 
efforts allows a quality public education to be normatively 
conceptualized as a private good rather than a public good. Part III 
considers the import of conceptualizing a quality public education as 
a private good rather than a public good. Part IV concludes by 
suggesting alternative non-market based educational reform models 
that should be considered in order to re-conceptualize public 
education as a public rather than private good.  
23. This Article uses the term “quality public education” to mean: (i) being educated in 
environments that are safe and protective; (ii) content that is reflected in relevant criteria and 
allows for the acquisition of basic skills in literacy, numeracy and more importantly the 
acquisition of critical thinking skills; and (iii) outcomes that demonstrate knowledge and 
mastery of skills. See generally THE INT’L WORKING GRP. ON EDUC., UNICEF, DEFINING 
QUALITY IN EDUCATION (June 2000), available at http://www.unicef.org/education/files/ 
QualityEducation.PDF (the aforementioned criteria are three of five criteria suggestions by 
UNICEF as constituting a quality education). 
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I. THE DECLINE OF THE JUDICIAL REMEDIES AS AN EFFECTIVE
MECHANISM FOR REFORMING PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Scholars, commentators, and advocates often suggest that 
American public schools, particularly public schools that serve high 
numbers of poor and minority students, are in need of serious 
reform.
24
 The basis for their claim lies in the fact that white, African-
American, and Latino students often attend schools that are 
significantly segregated by race.
25
 For African-American and Latino 
students, they not only attend schools that are segregated by race, but 
that also have high levels of students living in poverty.
26
 The 
combination of racial segregation and high levels of students living in 
poverty makes it difficult for those schools to provide a high-quality 
education.
27
  
Nevertheless, the number of racially-segregated schools with high 
poverty levels providing sub-par education to students is only 
increasing.
28
 The reasons for this are manifold; but an important one 
24. See, e.g., RAVITCH, supra note 1, at 55 (noting that those seeking to reform public 
schools rely heavily on the argument that “public schools are failing and that Black and 
Hispanic students must be liberated from public schools”); Michael Heise, The Courts, 
Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 633, 643 
(2002) (analyzing public school reform effort and noting that “markedly few serious scholars 
dissent from the proposition that many urban public schools confront substantial challenges in 
their efforts to serve their students, many of whom are members of minority groups or come 
from low-income households or both”). 
25. See GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 18–19 (May 
15, 2014), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-
and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertain-future/Brown-at-60-
051814.pdf (describing the high levels of racial segregation in urban or central city schools for 
Black and Latino students).  
26. Id. at 15–16. 
27. Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the 
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 410–11 (2012) (“A small but high-
profile contingent of predominantly poor and minority schools defy the odds and achieve at 
high levels . . . [b]ut delivering a quality education to students under these circumstances can 
cost far more per pupil than it otherwise would.”) [hereinafter Black, Middle-Income]; Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education: The Courts’ 
Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2003) (“By any measure, predominately minority schools 
are not equal in their resources or their quality.”). 
28. See generally GARY ORFIELD, GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & JOHN KUCSERA, THE
UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT SORTING OUT DEEPENING CONFUSION ON SEGREGATION 
TRENDS (Mar. 2014), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/ 
integration-and-diversity/sorting-out-deepening-confusion-on-segregation-trends/Segregation-
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is that the institution long looked upon to improve schools for poor 
and minority students—the judiciary—has had limited success over 
the last forty years in doing so.
29
 This part examines the decline in the 
effectiveness of the judiciary in reforming public schools through 
school desegregation and school finance remedies.  
A. The Limits of Public School Reform Through Federal Court
School Desegregation Remedies 
For much of the mid-to-late twentieth century, attempts at 
equalizing public education opportunities for minority students were 
made through the federal judiciary. This was particularly true of 
federal school desegregation remedies.
30
 This part provides a brief 
overview and analysis of why federal court school desegregation 
remedies ultimately floundered as an effective vehicle in providing 
equal educational opportunities to minority students.  
When the Supreme Court declared racially-segregated schools 
unconstitutional, the Court recognized the ways in which racially-
segregated schools impede the ability of minority students to obtain a 
quality education.
31
 Yet in the immediate aftermath of Brown v. 
Board of Education, the Court was slow to require schools to take 
meaningful steps towards desegregating.
32
 It was not until the late 
Trends-Dispute-CRP-Researchers.pdf (arguing that segregation and inequality in public schools 
is increasing rather than decreasing).  
29. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: 
Understanding and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated 
Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 833–37 (2010) (describing how the Supreme Court’s school 
desegregation jurisprudence reconstitutionalized racially segregated schools and failed to 
remedy inferior schools).  
30. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 
YALE L.J. 2043, 2052–58 (2002) (analyzing federal court decisions attempting to desegregate 
public schools). 
31. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v.
Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (“Segregation of white and colored children 
in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when 
it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as 
denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a 
child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to (retard) the 
educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the 
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.”). 
32. See Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 1603 (noting that the court failed to do enough in 
the years after Brown to hasten desegregation and highlighting the fact that the Court in Brown 
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1960s that the Court became more aggressive in its mandate that 
schools desegregate. Among other things, the Court required schools 
to take affirmative steps, such as enacting race conscious plans for 
assigning students to schools, implementing racial quotas to ensure 
racial balance in schools, and bussing students.
33
 To be sure, those 
aggressive measures towards desegregation were initially effective. 
Public schools, in the South, where most of the federal court 
desegregation orders were put into place, ultimately became the most 
desegregated schools in the country.
34
 For a brief period, 
desegregation of schools was seen as an effective method for 
reforming the public school system for all—and particularly for 
minority—students.35 
Despite the initial success engendered by the school desegregation 
cases, the Supreme Court’s subsequent school desegregation 
jurisprudence suffered from two critical shortcomings that would go 
on to substantially impede the federal judiciary’s ability to effectively 
address racial segregation in schools.
36
 First, the Court upheld the 
“did not even order the Topeka Board of Education to admit Linda Brown to a segregated 
school”).  
33. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (requiring 
schools to take affirmative steps to dismantle segregated schools); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (allowing for racial quotas and busing as 
measures to desegregate schools). 
34. ORFIELD & FRANKENBERG, supra note 25, at 8–11, 18. 
35. Id. at 39 (“[T]here is also a mounting body of evidence indicating that desegregated
schools are linked to profound benefits for all children. In terms of social outcomes, racially 
integrated educational contexts provide students of all races with the opportunity to learn and 
work with children from a range of backgrounds. These settings foster critical thinking skills 
that are increasingly important in our multiracial society—skills that help students understand a 
variety of different perspectives.”).  
36. As other scholars have noted, the Supreme Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence 
was never a model of clarity or cohesiveness and this in part has contributed to the inability of 
school desegregation remedies to effectively address racial segregation in schools. See, e.g., 
Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary Status 
Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1109 
(1990) (“One of the intractable problems of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area of de 
jure segregation has been its inability to articulate a coherent theory of the constitutional harm 
resulting from de jure segregation of public schools that justifies desegregation as the principal 
means to eliminate the harm.”). The two shortcomings that I argue diminished the effectiveness 
of school desegregation remedies are not the only shortcomings but are instead, I suggest, the 
most salient.  
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sanctity of local control and school district boundary lines.
37
 In doing 
so, the Court narrowly interpreted the scope of the judiciary’s 
authority to remedy racial segregation between suburban and urban 
school districts. Importantly, in most urban cities, especially outside 
of the south, segregation in schools is caused by residential racial 
segregation between the suburbs and urban cities rather than de jure 
school segregation policies.
38
 Indeed, inter-district segregation rather 
than intra-district segregation is the most prevalent form of school 
segregation today.
39
 As a result, in order to effectively use a judicial 
remedy to desegregate schools in any meaningful way, especially 
outside of the south, courts would have to issue a school 
desegregation order between multiple school districts, not just within 
a single school district.  
Unfortunately, the possibility of a court issuing such a 
desegregation order was for all practical purposes foreclosed by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I).40 There, 
the Court found that a federal district court could not order an inter-
district school desegregation plan between a suburban Detroit school 
37. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a local property tax system of school financing system that resulted in 
unequal funding between school districts, reasoning that local control of school finance is 
important because it would result in “experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition 
for educational excellence”); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740–41 (1974) (declining to 
issue an inter-district school desegregation order reasoning that “[n]o single tradition in public 
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local 
autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and 
support for public schools and to quality of the educational process”).  
38. It is important to note however, that residential segregation between the suburbs and 
urban cities was very much caused by explicit federal, state, and local policies. Yet the Supreme 
Court does not recognize this state action as sufficient to trigger court mandated school 
desegregation orders. See generally Wilson, Leveling Localism, supra note 8, at 649–51 (2011) 
(analyzing the ways in which explicit government policies caused racial residential segregation 
in the suburbs and urban cities).  
39. See AMY STUART WELLS, CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INSTITUTE FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE, BOUNDARY CROSSING FOR DIVERSITY, EQUITY AND ACHIEVEMENT: INTER-DISTRICT 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 1 (Nov. 2009), available at 
http://www.onenationindivisible.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Wells_BoundaryCrossing.pdf 
(noting that “a full 84% of racial/ethnic segregation in U.S. public schools occurs between and 
not within school districts”); Erika K. Wilson, Towards a Theory of Equitable Federated 
Regionalism in Public Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1437–39 (2014) (describing how the 
combination of metropolitan fragmentation and residential segregation leads to intense 
segregation between rather than within school districts) [hereinafter Wilson, Regionalism].  
40. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741.
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system and the city of Detroit school system unless there was proof 
of an inter-district violation.
41
 Put another way, the Court in Milliken 
I required proof that “racially discriminatory acts of one or more 
school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district” 
before it would issue and inter-district desegregation order.
42
 In 
coming to this conclusion the Court reasoned that “traditions of local 
control of schools, together with the difficulty of a judicially 
supervised restructuring of local administration of schools, render 
improper and inequitable such an inter-district response to a 
constitutional violation found to have occurred only within a single 
school district.”43  
The standard for issuing an inter-district desegregation order set 
forth by the Court in Milliken I is a very difficult standard to meet. In 
fact, only a handful of courts have ordered an inter-district 
desegregation since the Court’s decision in Milliken I.44 By affording 
such weight to local control of schools and school district boundary 
lines, even in the face of racial segregation, the Court made it 
difficult to reach the most common type of segregation—inter-district 
segregation.
45
 To be sure, the Court’s focus in Milliken I on the 
primacy of local control and the sanctity of school district boundary 
lines is a key reason that school desegregation remedies are limited in 
the effect.  
The Supreme Court also compromised the efficacy of school 
desegregation by imposing an arduous causation requirement in 
41. Id. at 741–43.
42. Id. at 745.
43. Id. at 755.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(finding that Indiana intentionally discriminated through its drawing of municipal boundary 
lines, that such discrimination had the effect of causing racial segregation between school 
districts, and ordering an interdistrict school desegregation decree); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. 
Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding that the State of 
Arkansas intentionally created racially segregated housing conditions which in turn contributed 
to segregation between school districts and that an inter-district desegregation decree was 
warranted); Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding 
that an inter-district school desegregation order was appropriate where school district boundary 
lines in Kentucky were previously ignored for the purpose of maintain segregated schools); 
Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming an inter-district desegregation order 
where there was evidence of inter-district de jure school segregation) 
45. See STUART WELLS, supra note 39.
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school desegregation cases.
46
 In these cases, plaintiffs must show a 
causal connection between past state-mandated school segregation 
policies and the segregation that exists in schools today, in order to 
obtain or sustain a federal court desegregation order.
47
 This causation 
standard is a stark departure from the Court’s previous plaintiff-
friendly causation standards.  
Initially, in Keyes v. School District No. 1 the Court afforded 
plaintiffs a generous causation presumption that made it relatively 
easy for them to show a connection between past segregation in 
schools and existing racial segregation in schools.
48
 In Keyes, one of 
the first desegregation cases to reach the Supreme Court outside of 
the South, the Court was asked to decide the appropriate legal to 
apply standard when examining segregation in schools that was the 
result of de facto rather than de jure school segregation.
49
 The Court 
held that if a plaintiff could establish that intentional discrimination 
was the cause of a substantial portion of segregation in a school 
district, they were entitled to a presumption that intentional 
discrimination was the cause of all other segregation within the 
school district.
50
 Under this presumption, causation between state 
action and the segregation that existed in schools was essentially 
presumed to exist.
51
  
The Keyes presumption was critical to the early success enjoyed 
by school desegregation plaintiffs. It “reflected either a belief, or 
perhaps a value, that absent defendant's illegal actions, racial equality 
would exist in our public schools . . . [and] [a]ny racial disparity was 
presumed to have been caused by defendant, not by private forces.”52 
46. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992). 
47. Black, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 1731 (arguing that “[t]he centrality of causation to 
the fall of educational claims is most obvious in school desegregation”). 
48. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
49. Id. at 192.
50. Id. at 208.
51. See Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 
1170 (1999–2000) (noting that in the Supreme Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence, 
initially, “proximate cause played only a minimal role in school desegregation . . . [d]efendants 
were generally held responsible for all disparities, and little attention was paid to defining the 
precise effects caused by the violation”) [hereinafter Parker, Desegregation]. 
52. Id.
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Over time, however, the Keyes presumption was either not applied at 
all or when it was applied, it was substantially weakened.  
For example, in Milliken I, the Court declined to apply the Keyes 
presumption at all despite clear evidence that state-sponsored 
segregation led to substantial segregation in the urban Detroit school 
district.
53 
In fact, the court in Milliken I did not even mention the 
Keyes presumption. In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, the 
Court did apply the Keyes presumption, but the Court required
 
the 
plaintiffs to show the “incremental segregative effects” that de jure 
school assignment policies had on the student population of a school, 
and to compare it to what the population of the school would have 
been in the absence of the segregative effect of the de jure 
assignment policy.
54
 Importantly, the Court then noted that federal 
courts could only order a remedy designed to address the difference 
between what the student population would have been in the absence 
of the de jure assignment policy and what it was as a result of the de 
jure assignment policy.
55
  
Subsequent Supreme Court cases continued to ratchet up the 
causation requirement for plaintiffs while loosening it for defendants. 
For example, in Freeman v. Pitts the Court held that the Keyes 
presumption could essentially be rebutted by a defendant school 
district through a showing that demographic changes or residential 
segregation was responsible for segregation in schools.
56
 The ruling 
in Freeman made it even more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain or 
sustain school desegregation orders while simultaneously making it 
easier for defendants to escape liability.
57
  
53. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (acknowledging the record before the
district court contained “evidence of de jure segregated conditions only in the Detroit schools”). 
54. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977). 
55. Id. 
56. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992) (“[T]he de jure violation becomes more
remote in time and these demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a current 
racial imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior de jure system. The causal link 
between current conditions and the prior violation is even more attenuated if the school district 
has demonstrated its good faith.”). 
57. See Parker, Desegregation, supra note 51, at 1178 (arguing that “the Court has 
steadily increased the viability of proximate cause as a limit on the reach of school 
desegregation litigation by accepting racial segregation and disparities”). 
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In sum, the preference for local control of public education, along 
with the heightened causation standard in school desegregation cases, 
played a significant role in limiting the effectiveness of the federal 
judiciary in addressing racial segregation in schools.
58
 While some 
schools are still operating under school desegregation orders, many 
school districts have been released from federal court supervision.
59
 
Further, even when school districts remain under federal court 
desegregation orders, due to shifting racial demographics, the school 
districts remain segregated by race.
60
 For those reasons, the efficacy 
of judicially based reform of public schools through school 
desegregation orders continues to decline significantly.  
B. The Limits of School Reform Through School Finance Litigation
Another way in which judicial reform of public schools is 
attempted is through school finance reform litigation. Those who 
seek reform of schools through school finance litigation do so under a 
theory that students—particularly students in predominately 
minority-attended, urban public schools—are performing very poorly 
academically and that an infusion of more financial resources into the 
schools will help improve their academic performance.
61
 While the 
accuracy of this theory is subject to much debate, it is the driving 
force behind attempts to reform urban schools through school finance 
litigation.
62
  
58. See, e.g., Black, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 1737–38 (“[T]he retreat from
presumption regarding causation ultimately marked the end of mandatory desegregation and 
allowed resegregation to take its place.”). 
59. Parker, Decline, supra note 10, at 1655 (“Most school districts have been declared
fully unitary . . . .”).  
60. See, e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE 
LAW 208–09 (1995). 
61. See Michael Heise, Litigated Learning, Law’s Limits, and Urban School Reform 
Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1419, 1451 (2007) (noting that two assumptions underpin school 
finance lawsuits-that school quality is best understood in terms of student achievement and that 
student academic achievement is a function of spending). 
62. The debate regarding the importance of school funding to academic achievement is
complex and nuanced. Some commentators suggest that increased funding to schools does not 
correlate with increased academic performance while others take the opposite view. See, e.g., 
Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 423, 425 (1991) (arguing that “there is no systematic relationship between school 
expenditures and student performance. . . . Legal arguments and policy decisions that allegedly 
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Putting aside the question of whether or not there is indeed a link 
between school funding and academic achievement, scholars and 
commentators often find that predominantly poor and minority urban 
schools receive less funding than more affluent, typically 
predominantly white suburban schools.
63
 That is the case because a 
major component of school funding is local property taxes.
64
 Urban 
school districts tend to be located in poorer areas that are able to 
collect fewer local property taxes; consequently, urban school 
districts typically allocate less local funding to schools than more 
affluent, typically suburban districts.
65
  
This system of funding schools through local property taxes was 
initially challenged in federal court as violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause.66 Advocates alleged that all 
children were entitled to have the same amount of money spent on 
their education but that local property taxation schemes for funding 
schools resulted in students in poorer districts having less money 
spent on them than students in more affluent districts in violation of 
the U.S. Constitution.
67
 However, the Supreme Court ultimately 
rejected this argument and instead found that there is no fundamental 
right to an education under the Constitution and that local property 
advance educational equity are suspect if based on the conventional assumptions about 
expenditure variations.”); Marta Elliott, School Finance and Opportunities to Learn: Does 
Money Well Spent Enhance Students’ Achievement?, 71 SOC. EDUC. 223, 233 (1998) (finding 
that “per-pupil expenditures indirectly increase students’ achievement by giving them access to 
educated teachers who use effective pedagogies in the classroom”).  
63. See, e.g., Black, Middile-Income, supra note 27, at 374 (“[P]redominantly poor and 
minority schools routinely receive thousands of dollars less per pupil than their suburban 
counterparts.”); Gillian B. White, The Data Are Damning: How Race Influences School 
Funding, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/ 
09/public-school-funding-and-the-role-of-race/408085/ (examining research showing that in 
Pennsylvania, “districts that have a higher proportion of white students get substantially higher 
funding than districts that have more minority students”). 
64. Wilson, Regionalism, supra note 39, at 1444–45 (describing the ways in which school 
districts are funding through the levying of property taxes on all of the properties that lie within 
the school district’s boundaries).  
65. Id. at 1444–45 (“School districts that encompass higher valued property can 
levy taxes at a lower rate yet still collect large sums of money while school districts that 
encompass lower valued property must levy taxes at a higher rate but still collect less money, 
thereby allowing fiscal disparities between districts to persist.”). 
66. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
67. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance 
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 601–04 (1994).  
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tax funding schemes were rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental purpose.
68
 
After being rejected by the Supreme Court, school funding 
advocates next turned to state constitutions to make claims for equal 
funding of schools.
69
 They did so under two different theories. The 
first theory was an equity theory—that local property funding 
schemes were unconstitutional under state constitutions because they 
violated provisions in state constitutions specifically enumerating a 
right to an education.
70
 Under this theory, advocates challenged per-
pupil spending disparities between districts as violating state 
constitutions on state equal protection grounds and sought parity in 
per-pupil expenditures between districts.
71
 
The second theory was an adequacy theory—that the quality of 
education students in urban school districts was inadequate and 
therefore violated state constitutional provisions regarding a right to 
an education.
72
 In adequacy challenges to systems of school funding, 
plaintiffs essentially asked courts to “compel the state to do more 
than simply open up schools and demand student attendance; . . . [but 
to] ensure that some meaningful level of education is offered in the 
schools.”73 More often than not plaintiffs seeking to reform schools 
through pleading both equity and adequacy theories of relief.
74
 
Equity and adequacy based school finance reform efforts are 
achieving mixed success, with adequacy claims often proving more 
successful that equity claims.
75
 Yet neither equity nor adequacy 
68. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 1.
69. See Thro, supra note 67.
70. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (challenging constitutionality 
of New Jersey school funding statutes on the grounds that they discriminated against students in 
area with low property tax rates under the New Jersey constitution); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 
929 (Cal. 1976) (finding that the California local property taxation for funding schools violated 
the California constitution equal protection clause); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cnty. v. 
State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (finding the Washington system of local property taxation to 
fund schools unconstitutional under the Washington state constitution). 
71. Thro, supra note 67, at 600–01. 
72. Id. at 601–02. 
73. See Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School 
Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1206 (2011). 
74. Id. at 1207 (“[A]dequacy claims are typically raised alongside equity arguments
. . . .”).  
75. Id. at 1208. 
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claims have come close to effectively reforming public schools 
attended by predominately poor and minority students for a number 
of reasons. Three fundamental reasons for the limited success of 
school finance litigation in reforming urban public schools are worth 
highlighting.  
First, school finance lawsuits in general are premised upon the 
idea that academic achievement is an appropriate barometer for 
whether a school is providing quality education and that increasing 
funding to public schools will increase students’ academic 
achievement.
76
 This is a specious claim that over time has proved 
increasingly faulty. The variables that ultimately influence a student’s 
academic achievement are manifold and do not always correlate 
precisely with the type of education that the student is being 
provided. Indeed, research suggests that factors outside of school, 
such as family environment, access to quality pre-school, and other 
intangible social environment factors, influence a student’s academic 
achievement more so than the particular school they attend.
77
 Further, 
owing in part to the success of both equity and access claims, some 
urban schools receive more in funding per-pupil than non-urban 
districts.
78
 Yet the increased funding has not overhauled urban 
student achievement.
79
 
Second, adequacy claims have found some success, but they 
grapple with appropriately defining and measuring what it means to 
provide an “adequate” education.80 Adequacy lawsuits are often 
premised on language in state constitutions that require the state to 
provide a certain kind of education to students such as “thorough” or 
“efficient.” Courts facing adequacy-based cases struggle to determine 
what constitutes an "adequate" education, leading to a variety of 
76. See Tang, supra note 73, at 1211–13.
77. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 22–
23 (1966) (finding a higher correlation between student achievement and non-school based 
factors); Heise, supra note 61, at 1458 (“To the extent that such variables as familial 
interactions (or lack thereof), poverty, diet, and home stability are among the set of variables 
that influence student achievement and are not surmountable by whatever positive influence a 
school can muster, then an already difficult litigation task becomes virtually impossible.”). 
78. Heise, supra note 61, at 1447. 
79. Id. at 1450. 
80. Tang, supra note 73, at 1207–08 (noting that the difficulties and methods that judges 
in adequacy suits use to determine what constitutes an adequate education). 
2016] Blurred Lines 207 
opinions and remedies.
81
 Importantly, with adequacy cases, 
legitimate separation of powers concerns exist, because state 
constitutions often contain specific language that delegates the task of 
developing a system of school financing to the state legislature.
82
 For 
that reason, there is often great deference given to state legislatures to 
determine how much and how to spend money to ensure an 
“adequate” education.83 Even when courts are ambitious in defining 
what constitutes a constitutionally adequate education, the road to 
implementation can be complex, arduous and often left to the whims 
of the various state legislatures.
84
 Thus, judicially based adequacy 
remedies often suffer from a lack of consistency across jurisdictions 
as to what constitutes a constitutionally adequate education, and how 
much money state legislatures are actually willing to spend to ensure 
that students receive an “adequate” education. To that end, adequacy 
suits have at best achieved mixed results, depending upon the 
jurisdiction.  
Finally, even when states have the political will and energy to 
make substantial changes, funding disparities still persist between 
wealthy and non-wealthy school districts, primarily due to the 
infusion of private money in wealthy districts that goes beyond state 
81. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (finding that the North
Carolina state constitution guaranteed every child an opportunity to receive a sound basic 
education in our public schools and outlining specific academic skills that would meet that 
criteria); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 187 Misc. 2d 1, 11, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 475, 483 (Sup. 
Ct. 2001) (finding that the system of education in New York violated the state constitution but 
noting that under the state constitution a “state of the art” education is not required; rather all 
that is required is an education that instills students with the skills they need to become 
productive citizens).  
82. See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 56 (R.I. 1995) (grappling with 
the appropriateness of the court weighing in on school finance questions and noting that “[t]he 
education clause leaves all such determinations to the General Assembly’s broad discretion to 
adopt the means it deems ‘necessary and proper’ in complying with the constitutional 
directive”). 
83. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 187 Misc. 2d at 77 (“The choice of measures
designed to remedy the constitutional violation described herein lies in the first instance with 
the State Legislature informed by the expertise of the Governor, SED, BOE and the Regents. At 
this juncture, the court does not prescribe the precise spending measures that must be taken.”). 
84. See generally Paul L. Tractenberg, Beyond Educational Adequacy: Looking Backward 
and Forward Through the Lens of New Jersey, 4 STAN. J. C.R & C.L. 411 (2008) (describing 
New Jersey’s Abbott litigation and the road to achieving an adequate education in New Jersey). 
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allocations of funds.
85
 States for the most part do not stop wealthy 
districts from spending above and beyond minimal state allocations.
86
 
To be sure, even if they did, it is not guaranteed that reducing funding 
disparities between wealthy and non-wealthy districts would actually 
improve the educational opportunities for students in less affluent 
districts. For these reasons, school finance litigation is not a 
completely effective mechanism for reforming school systems, 
particularly urban school systems.  
II. THE RISE OF MARKET-BASED REFORMS
As a consequence of the shortcomings of school desegregation 
litigation and school finance litigation discussed in the previous part, 
efforts to reform public schools—particularly public schools with 
large numbers of poor and minority students—do not prominently 
feature in litigation-based reform strategies. Instead, there continues 
to be a great deal of debate regarding the efficacy of litigation-based 
school reform strategies in general,
87
 and more specifically, the 
institutional competency of courts to solve the complex issues 
inherent to issues of public school reform.
88
 To that end, much of the 
recent debate around school reform is focused outside of the courts.  
While lawsuits challenging the sufficiency of urban education are 
still ongoing,
89
 the predominant forms of school reform for poor and 
minority students are related to ensuring that they have more choice 
85. See generally John Schomberg, Equity v. Autonomy: The Problems of Private 
Donations to Public Schools, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 143 (1998) (chronicling the equity 
problems that can occur when more affluent schools accept parental donations and how such 
donations can have the effect of nullifying state attempts to create funding parity between 
school districts).  
86. See Reynolds, supra note 15, at 759 (“[I]n most states, school districts retain the 
ability to set their own upper limits on spending. Though statutory reform may push up the 
bottom to ensure that all districts receive at least a certain minimum level of per-pupil dollars, 
only a few states have dared to limit the expenditures at the top.”). 
87. See, e.g., Ryan & Heise, supra note 30, at 654–56 (describing the difficulties posed by 
courts attempting to reform schools through school finance litigation). 
88. See ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES,
AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 138–41 (2011).  
89. See, e.g., Teresa Watanbee, Compton Unified Sued for Allegedly Failing to Address 
Trauma-Affected Students, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/ 
la-me-ln-trauma-school-lawsuit-20150518-story.html. 
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in where they go to school.
90
 This part suggests that market-based 
reforms such as charter schools, vouchers, and other school-choice 
related programs are now the primary reform mechanisms while 
reform-based litigation plays a much less prominent role. It outlines 
the rise of market-based reforms and argues that market-based 
reforms allow public education to be conceptualized as private good 
rather than a public good.  
A. Choice as Reform
Students are typically assigned to public schools in accordance 
with where they live.
91
 As a result, the demographics of schools and 
school districts for the most part mirror the demographics of the 
neighborhoods and localities in which they are located.
92
 To the 
extent those neighborhoods and localities are racially and 
economically segregated, public schools are as well.
93
 The harms of 
racially and economically segregated schools are well documented.
94
 
In order to ameliorate the harms of racially segregated and 
underfunded schools, judicially-based public school reform efforts 
often attempt to disrupt the strong tie between school and municipal 
boundary lines that all too often leads to schools being racially 
segregated and underfunded.
95
 Indeed, as Professors James Ryan and 
Michael Heise observed: 
90. See, e.g., Karla Scoon Reid, Minority Parents Quietly Embrace School Choice, 
EDUCATION WEEK (Dec. 5, 2001), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2001/12/05/14intro 
minority.h21.html (noting that “[m]any minority parents are impatient at what they see as the 
plodding pace of school reform; they’re concerned that their own children won’t benefit from 
long-term improvements to the current public school system”). 
91. See Wilson, Leveling Localism, supra note 8, at 627 (“[S]chool district boundary lines
are drawn so that students for the most part attend schools in close proximity to where they 
live.”).  
92. See Wilson, Regionalism, supra note 39, at 1438–39. 
93. Id.
94. Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African Americans, Latinos, and Unequal 
Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION 53, 53–55 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996). 
95. See Ryan & Heise, supra 30, at 2050 (noting that both school desegregation and 
school finance reform “sought to equalize opportunities by erasing boundaries, whether 
physical or financial, that separated schools and school districts”). 
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To a very real extent, both school desegregation and school 
finance reform pitted equality of opportunity against local 
control regarding student attendance and finances. Put 
differently, desegregation and school finance reform often 
threatened the concept of the traditional neighborhood school 
attended only by local students and paid for primarily by local 
residents who could devote as much money to their “own” 
schools as they wished.
96
 
Yet, as described in Part I, school desegregation and school finance 
reform efforts achieved only limited success in challenging the public 
education local control paradigm. In many ways, Supreme Court 
decisions like Milliken I reified rather than disrupted the sanctity of 
local control over schools.
97
 As a result, a concerted push outside the 
judicial system to change the ways in which students are assigned to 
schools emerged as an alternative to judicial remedies for improving 
educational opportunities for poor and minority students.
98
  
Importantly, the quest to change the way in which students are 
assigned to schools is undergirded by the idea that infusing more 
choice into the school assignment process will both improve the 
options available to individual students and spur competition between 
schools that improves the public school system as a whole.
99
 This 
approach to school assignment is undoubtedly a relic of free-market 
principles.
100
 Proponents of choice-based reform suggest that infusing 
more choice into the public school system will breed competition by 
schools for students.
101
 This competition will allow parents to choose 
which school they want their children to attend, which will in turn 
incentivize schools to provide high quality public education so that 
96. Ryan & Heise, supra note 30, at 2050–51. 
97. Id. at 2046–52. 
98. Id. at 2051 (“The core principle of school choice is an equitable one, as school choice 
grants poorer students an opportunity—the chance to choose their own schools—that is now 
reserved for wealthier students.”).  
99. Black, Charter Schools, supra note 18, at 458 (“Those favoring an individualized
concept of education argue that the absence of competition in the traditional public school 
system is the weakness that stymies its progress. For them, it is the marketplace and the 
competition it brings that would force schools to be responsive to individuals.”).  
100. Henry M. Levin, Education as a Public and Private Goods, 6 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 628, 629 (1987). 
101. Id.
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parents will choose their school for their children.
102
 It will also give 
students the opportunity to select the school that best meets their 
needs.
103
  
Conceptually, the idea that such a free-market approach is 
appropriate for the dissemination of public education was rooted in 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters.104 
There, the Court found that parents have a liberty interest in 
controlling the way in which their children are raised and upheld 
parents’ rights to opt out of the public school system and send their 
children to a private school.
105
 While the Court’s holding in Pierce 
paved the way for the proliferation of private schools that exists 
today, the Court’s reasoning in Pierce is now being extrapolated to 
justify choice-based public school reform.
106
 The choice-based public 
school reform movement consists of vouchers, charter schools, and 
various school-district-wide choice programs. Each of these choice-
based reform programs is discussed in-turn.  
1. Vouchers
Voucher programs allow public tax dollars to be given to parents 
to use to pay tuition at private schools.
107
 To date, at least fourteen 
states and the District of Columbia have adopted voucher 
programs.
108
 Many of the voucher programs are limited to students 
who are poor and/or attending a school that is deemed failing or 
performing poorly.
109
 Notably, the amount of funding offered by each 
102. Id. 
103. See id. at 636.
104. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
105. Id.
106. See Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 
99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1093 (2013) (“Using the ‘constitutional values’ articulated in Pierce, 
proponents of choice justify market and public choice as expressions of the moral and legal 
right of parents to leave the school system.”). 
107. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 30, at 2078. 
108. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SCHOOL VOUCHER LAWS: STATE-BY-
STATE COMPARISON (Jan. 2014), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/StateBy 
StateVoucherComparison.pdf; Fast Facts on School Choice, EDCHOICE http://www.edchoice. 
org/our-resources/fast-facts/ (last modified Aug. 22, 2016). 
109. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 108. For example,
Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, North Carolina and Ohio all limit their voucher programs to poor 
students and/or students attending failing schools.  
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of the voucher programs is relatively modest.
110
 As a result, vouchers 
are typically used at moderately priced religious schools rather than 
the more elite religious or secular schools.
111
 While voucher 
programs remain rather limited in their scope, they are proliferating, 
and states increasingly view them as a viable alternative to reforming 
public education for poor and minority students.
112
 
2. Charter Schools
Charter schools are publicly funded schools that are run by private 
persons or corporations.
113
 Students are not required to pay tuition to 
attend charter schools.
114
 Charter schools are exempt from most state 
rules and regulations and in exchange are required to meet certain 
performance accountability standards.
115
 Charter schools are seen as 
an attractive alternative to traditional public schools precisely 
because they are not required to adhere to state rules and 
regulations.
116
 Indeed, because they are not required to meet certain 
state rules and regulations, charter schools are often conceptualized 
as being innovative and able to enact rules such as longer work days 
for teachers in order to meet the special needs of poor and minority 
students.
117
 In school systems serving large numbers of poor and 
110. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 108. Most of the 
voucher programs are limited to the state-level per-pupil expenditures. 
111. See James, supra note 7, at 1095.
112. KATHERINE CIERNIAK ET AL., CTR. FOR EVALUATION & EDUC. POLICY, MAPPING THE 
GROWTH OF STATEWIDE VOUCHER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (Mar. 2015), 
available at http://ceep.indiana.edu/projects/PDF/Statewide_Vouchers_CEEP_EPB.pdf (noting 
that “[t]he number and scope of statewide voucher programs targeting students from low-
income households (and/in some cases attending poorly performing schools) have expanded 
quickly in recent years”). 
113. See Thomas A. Kelley III, North Carolina Charter Schools’ (Non-?) Compliance with 
State and Federal Nonprofit Law, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757, 1767 (2015). 
114. Id.
115. See James, supra note 7, at 1096; Kelley III, supra note 113, at 1767. 
116. See Kelly III, supra note 113, at 1767 (“To allow for innovation, charter schools are 
exempt from most of the rules, regulations, and statutes that apply to other public schools.”); 
PUB. SCHS. FIRST N.C., THE FACTS ON CHARTER SCHOOLS (2013), available at 
http://www.publicschoolsfirstnc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/PSFNC-Charter-School-Fact-
Sheet.pdf (chronicling the ways in which charter schools are exempt from regulations and 
statutes in North Carolina that apply to other North Carolina public schools).  
117. For example, schools like the Harlem Success Academy and the KIPP schools often
cite to their status as charter schools that are not required to adhere to the same formalities as 
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minority students, charter schools have grown so much that in many 
instances they either approximate or exceed the number of traditional 
public schools in the school district.
118
 
3. School-District-Wide School Choice Programs
School-district-wide choice programs offer another way in which 
choice is infused into public education as a means of reforming 
public schools. Such programs allow students to elect out of the 
school they are assigned to attend according to their address. Instead, 
district-wide choice programs allow students to attend another 
traditional public school outside of their assigned neighborhood 
school.
119
 They may also attempt to create more diversity, 
particularly to attract more white students, by establishing magnet 
schools- schools that offer specialized instruction in a particular 
area.
120
 The majority of these programs are intra-district, meaning 
traditional public schools as the reasons for their success. See, e.g., Alexandria Neason, Charter 
Schools Latest Innovation: Keeping Teachers Happy, SLATE MAGAZINE (Apr. 27, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/schooled/2015/04/27/charter_schools_and_churn_and_burn_how_ 
they_re_trying_to_hold_on_to_teachers.html; Kate Taylor, At Success Academy Charter 
Schools, High Test Scores and Polarizing Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/nyregion/at-success-academy-charter-schools-polarizing-
methods-and-superior-results.html?_r=0 (describing the tactics that make Harlem success 
academy uses to achieve results such as teachers working twelve hour days and public 
disclosure of students test results in order to shame the students into performing better).  
118. See, e.g., Michael Allison Chandler, Enrollment Up in DC Public Schools for the 
Seventh Consecutive Year, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/education/enrollment-up-in-dc-public-schools-for-seventh-consecutive-year/2015/10/20/ 
84ef94ec-7742-11e5-bc80-9091021aeb69_story.html (noting that in Washington D.C. “Charter 
schools continue to serve about 44 percent of the city’s public schools”); Alan Greenblatt, New 
Orleans District Moves to an All Charter System, NPR.ORG (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.npr. 
org/sections/ed/2014/05/30/317374739/new-orleans-district-moves-to-an-all-charter-system 
(describing the shift in the predominately poor and minority school system in New Orleans to 
an all charter system of schools).  
119. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., CREATING STRONG DISTRICT CHOICE PROGRAMS
(May 2004), available at https://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/choiceprograms/report.pdf 
(describing the various types of district wide choice programs, including open-enrollment 
which allows parents to choose any school within a school district and specially themed magnet 
schools). 
120. Christine Rossell, Whatever Happened to Magnet Schools? No Longer Famous But
Still Intact, EDUC. NEXT (Spring 2005), available at http://educationnext.org/files/ednext 
20052_44.pdf (describing magnet schools as being created in order to “draw white students to 
predominantly black schools by offering a special education with a focus on a particular aspect 
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that students can only exercise choice within the district, not between 
districts, thereby severely limiting the number of truly viable options 
for students in predominately poor and minority school districts.
121
 
Nevertheless, school-district-wide choice programs are also often 
conceptualized as a means of improving educational options for poor 
and minority students.
122
  
B. Quality Public Education as a Private Good
The aforementioned market-based reforms have achieved varying 
success in improving educational opportunities for individual 
students.
123
 Yet the reforms do not improve the public education 
system as a whole. Choice-based market reforms are premised on the 
idea that certain schools are inadequate and students should be able to 
leave those schools for greener pastures. The reforms do nothing to 
improve the inadequate schools that students are leaving behind. To 
the contrary, a rich body of literature suggests that market-based 
reforms only make the schools left behind worse.
124
  
of the curriculum, such as performing arts, or Montessori, or advanced math, science, and 
technology”).  
121. Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 800–01 (2005) (describing the widespread availability of intra-district 
choice programs and noting that “there are few meaningful options for public 
school choice within district boundaries in inner-city school systems”).  
122. Id. at 800. 
123. See, e.g., Susan Dynarski, Urban Charter Schools Often Succeed. Suburban Ones 
Don’t, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/upshot/a-suburban-
urban-divide-in-charter-school-success-rates.html (finding that “[i]n urban areas, where 
students are overwhelmingly low-achieving, poor and nonwhite, charter schools tend to do 
better than other public schools in improving student achievement”); Matthew M. Cringos & 
Paul E. Peterson, A Generation of School Voucher Success, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444184704577585582150808386 (“[A] study 
shows that an African-American student who was able to use a voucher to attend a private 
school was 24% more likely to enroll in college than an African-American student who didn’t 
win a voucher lottery.”).  
124. See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG, GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & JIA WANG, CHOICE
WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
STANDARDS (Jan. 2010), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/ 
integration-and-diversity/choice-without-equity-2009-report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-
2010.pdf (finding that charter schools are increasing racial segregation in schools); CTR. FOR 
RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY 82 (2013), available at 
http://credo.stanford.edu/documents/NCSS%202013%20Final%20Draft.pdf (finding that 
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Importantly, market-based reforms like vouchers, quality charter 
schools, and slots in quality public choice programs are in limited 
supply.
125
 Thus, poor and minority students trapped in failing schools 
must compete with one another for even the chance to achieve 
improved educational opportunities. This part argues that 
combination of these two forces results in public education being 
conceptualized as a private rather than public good. The part first 
provides an operational definition of public and private goods. It then 
makes the argument that market-based reforms, combined with 
localist public education governance structures, are situating public 
education as a private rather than public good.  
1. Private and Public Goods: An Operational Definition
Public goods theory lays a theoretical foundation for how much of 
a particular good the government should supply.
126 
In theorizing how 
much of a particular good the government should supply, public 
goods theory characterizes goods as either public goods or private 
goods. Public goods are goods that are non-excludable and non-
rivalrous.
127
 Non-excludable “means that it is difficult to keep people 
from consuming the good once it has been produced.”128 Non-
rivalrous means that that once the good is produced it can be 
consumed by an additional person at no additional cost.
129
 On the 
other hand, private goods are rivalrous and excludable, meaning one 
person’s consumption of the good precludes another person from 
consuming the good and that the good can only be consumed by an 
additional person at an additional cost.
130
 Examples of public goods 
include highways and national defense; once these goods are 
students in charter schools perform similar to or worse than students in traditional public 
schools).  
125. See, e.g., Kyle Spencer, School Choice Is No Cure All, Harlem Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 2, 2012) (describing the limited supply of high quality magnet and charter schools 
available in Harlem, N.Y.).  
126. See generally Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REV 
ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954); RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF 
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 143–239 (2d ed. 1996). 
127. Holcombe, supra note 19, at 1.
128. Id. at 2. 
129. Id. at 1, 2.
130. Samuelson, supra note 126, at 387–89.
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produced it is not practically feasible to stop others from enjoying 
those goods, and an additional person’s consumption of the good 
does not add additional costs.
131
 Examples of private goods include 
goods such as food and clothing.  
Some theorists suggest that goods with one or both of the 
characteristics of a public good (e.g., non-rivalrous or non-
excludable) should be produced by the government because it is more 
efficient for the government to produce such goods.
132
 They further 
suggest that this is the case because there is lack of an incentive for 
the private market to produce goods that have one or both 
characteristics of a public good.
133
 Thus, a key component of goods 
that have one or more characteristics of a public good is that the state 
needs to provide it in order to ensure an appropriate or optimal 
allocation of the good.
134
 On the other hand, goods that are 
characterized as private goods are thought to be optimally allocated 
or provided through private markets, because the profits will motivate 
appropriate and optimal allocation of the goods through the private 
market.
135
 
Importantly, education is neither a pure public or private good. It 
is instead an impure or quasi-public good.
136
 Impure or quasi-public 
goods are goods that contain some characteristics of public goods and 
some characteristics of private goods.
137
 Education it is considered an 
impure-public good because the possibility of excludability exists.
138
 
131. Holcombe, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
132. Samuelson, supra note 126, at 387–89.
133. Id.
134. See DAVID BRIDGES & TERENCE H. MCLAUGHLIN, EDUCATION AND THE MARKET
PLACE 139 (1996) (“Public goods will be underprovided without state intervention.”). To be 
sure, there is much debate as to whether the state must always produce goods that have one or 
more characteristics of a public good. The private market has provided and is capable in some 
instances of providing certain types of public goods. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright 
and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 643 (2007) 
(“What began as a framework for determining the proper scope of public expenditure has 
evolved into a technical term of art that is no longer coterminous with goods that must be 
provided by the government.”).  
135. Samuelson, supra note 126, at 387–89.
136. Brooks, supra note 21; Lubienski, supra note 21. 
137. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 126, at 9. 
138. For example, you could exclude students from receiving a specific type of education
by requiring that they pay tuition or requiring that they live in a certain area in order to obtain 
the education. Education in charter schools is also often limited by weighted lottery systems. 
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Yet for reasons having to do with pragmatics and government 
legitimacy, public education continues to be produced by state 
governments.
139
 Indeed, despite education being an impure public 
good, the state provides public education because of the large number 
of positive externalities that public education provides. Those 
positive externalities include “benefits to the community or society at 
large . . . in terms of equality of opportunity, social cohesion, 
democratic benefits, law and order, economic growth” for which “the 
external benefits or costs are likely to be available to all with zero 
marginal costs.”140 Thus, because of the aforementioned positive 
externalities associated with education it is considered an impure or 
quasi-public good which justifies the state providing it.  
As argued in the next part however, the infusion of market-based 
reforms threatens to push the way that we conceptualize public 
education further away from that of an impure public good and closer 
to that of a private good. Such a shift has important implications for 
the level of public education that the state will then be willing to 
provide. It also has important implications for the ability of the most 
vulnerable members of the public education marketplace—poor and 
minority students—to receive a quality public education.  
2. Market-Based Reforms Combined Situate Public Education as
a Private Good
The current slate of reforms situates public education, particularly 
for poor and minority students, closer to that of a private good. They 
do so in two ways: first by emphasizing the individual benefits of 
public education rather than the collective benefits of public 
education, and second by shifting the responsibility for obtaining a 
quality public education from the state to parents and students. With 
respect to the emphasis on individual rather than collective benefits, 
the rationale for charters, vouchers and certain school-district-wide 
choice programs is premised upon the idea that individual students 
See generally Katie Ash, Weighted Admissions Lotteries: Will They Reshape Charter 
Demographics, EDUC. WEEK (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/03/ 
18/26charterlottery.h33.html. 
139. BRIDGES & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 134, at 143. 
140. Id.
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and parents should be able to improve their own lot by moving to a 
better performing school. The reforms do not attempt to address the 
problems with the schools that students are leaving behind. Instead, 
the market-based rationale for these reforms merely presumes that the 
prospect of students exiting poorly performing schools will spur 
competition and force those schools to improve.
141
  
Yet the premise that competition will improve the poorly 
performing schools is faulty. In fact, in most states, state money 
follows students. Therefore, when students leave traditional public 
schools for a charter school, a voucher program, or a better public 
school through a school choice program, the public school that the 
student would have attended loses some or all of the state per-pupil 
allotment that the school would have received if the student 
remained.
142
 While proponents of market-based reforms contend that 
the public schools are not worse off, because they still receive the 
same amount of local money to educate fewer students,
143
 there is 
room for debate as to whether the local money is sufficient in and of 
itself, particularly since many of the students left behind in the 
traditional public schools have greater needs.
144
 Further, aside from 
141. See supra Part II.A.
142. See generally Preston C. Green III et al., Having It Both Ways: How Charter Schools 
Try to Obtain Funding of Public Schools and the Autonomy of Private Schools, 63 EMORY L.J. 
303 (2013) (describing the ways in which charter schools receive public funding); Julie F. 
Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling: Examining Voucher 
Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 703, 706 
(2015) (noting that “in voucher programs, the funds flow directly from state coffers to parents 
in the form of a voucher that can only be spent at a private school participating in the 
program”). 
143. See generally Valerie Strauss, Separating Fact From Fiction: 21 Claims About 
Charter Schools, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2015/02/28/separating-fact-from-fiction-in-21-claims-about-charter-schools/; Michael 
McShane, School Choice Critics Try to Have it Both Ways, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 8, 
2015), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/2015/09/08/school-choice-critics-try-
to-have-it-both-ways (“[A]lmost every program in the country allows only a fraction of a 
student’s per-pupil allotment to follow that student. For example, in Indiana, the voucher for 
low-income students is capped at 90 percent of the state’s contribution toward a child’s 
education. All of the locally raised tax dollars stay in the traditional public school system.”). 
144. See, e.g., Recent Cases, State Constitutional Law—Education Clause—Florida 
Supreme Court Declares State’s School Voucher Program Unconstitutional—Bush v. Holmes, 
919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2007) (describing the impact of 
market-based reforms such as vouchers on traditional public schools and noting that “the 
children left behind will be distinctly underprivileged in ways that will keep them in failing 
public schools being drained not only of funds, but also of their best students”). 
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money, few changes occur at poorly performing schools; instead 
poorly performing schools are likely to be closed down and the 
remaining students transferred to marginally better or equivalent 
public schools.
145
 
Moreover, that market-based reforms emphasize the individual, 
rather than collective, benefits of public education is evident in the 
limited supply of market-based reforms. For example, while there is a 
proliferation of charter schools, the number of high quality charter 
schools, particularly in school districts serving predominantly poor 
and minority students, is limited.
146
 Similarly, voucher programs are 
limited in the amount that they will pay which limits the ability of 
students using vouchers to attend more expensive and higher quality 
private schools.
147
 District-wide school choice programs also have 
limited number of slots for the high quality and most sought after 
schools.
148
 This results in the enactment of tools such as lotteries for 
slots in the better charter schools or magnet schools.
149
 In the end, 
145. Wilson, Gentrification, supra note 3, at 134–37.
146. See CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES (CREDO), STANFORD UNIV.,
MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES 1 (2009), available at 
http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_CHOICE_CREDO.pdf (“Nearly half of the 
charter schools nationwide have results that are no different from the local public school 
options and over a third, 37 percent, deliver learning results that are significantly worse than 
their student would have realized had they remained in traditional public schools.”); Dylan P. 
Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency, Accountability, and Success, 41 
J.L. & EDUC. 513, 514 (2012) (“[E]mpirical data reveal that there is inconsistent quality in the 
charter school sector. The results show that, in fact, charter schools may not be increasing the 
academic achievement of the children they serve when compared with traditional public 
schools.”). 
147. See, e.g., Brittany Bronson, Why Vouchers Won’t Fix Vegas Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/opinion/why-vouchers-wont-fix-vegas-
schools.html (noting that “[p]rivate school tuition in Nevada can be as high as $12,000, and the 
biggest problem with the vouchers is that the poorest families will be unable to make up the 
difference”).  
148. See, e.g., Marlon A. Walker, Parents Frustrated with DeKalb Magnet School Lottery,
ATLANTA J. CONST. (June 6, 2015), http://www.myajc.com/news/news/local-education/parents-
frustrated-with-dekalb-magnet-school-lotte/nmWPc/ (noting a parent’s frustration with magnet 
lottery school system and the parent indicating “[d]emand is more than supply, and the county 
has not done a thing about it. It’s no longer about merit. It’s about luck”). 
149. See, e.g., Neema Roshania, Philly Families Face High-Stakes Hunt for Prized Charter 
Lottery Slots, NETWORKS.ORG. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/ 
nw-philadelphia/79420-philly-families-face-high-stakes-hunt-for-prized-charter-school-lottery-
slots (chronicling the story of a family trying to win a coveted seat in a Philadelphia charter 
school through a lottery process).  
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students and families are left to scrap for a seat in a high-quality 
school, though most will fail to gain admission. Given the limited 
number of slots available for high-quality charter or magnet schools 
and the limited reach of voucher programs, a quality public education 
becomes rivalrous in that one student’s gain is another’s loss. 
Individual students may obtain some gains, but collectively the 
options available to students are not better. Collectively, students 
may in fact be worse off.  
The second way in which market-based reforms bring public 
education closer to conceptualization as a private, rather than a 
public, good is that it shifts our understanding of who should be 
responsible for ensuring a quality education. As discussed in Part 
II.B.1, private goods are those in which optimum allocation occurs
through the private market, not the government. In a nod to the
collective benefits provided by public education, the state provides
public education but the quality varies significantly by locality.
150
Prior to the enactment of market-based reforms, public school
reforms aimed at improving education for poor and minority students,
particularly judicially based reforms, placed pressure on the state not
just to provide an education, but to provide a quality education.
151
On the other hand, market-based reforms put the onus on parents 
and students to affirmatively seek out high quality public 
education.
152
 While the state continues to provide a basic or baseline 
education, the state ducks the issue of quality by putting the burden 
on parents to escape poorly performing or failing schools. Indeed, the 
proliferation of market-based reforms to the exclusion of any other 
types of reforms, tacitly allows state retrenchment from the duty of 
150. See Wilson, Regionalism, supra note 39, at 1444–45 (noting that the “combination of 
fragmentation and localism creates significant disparities between neighboring school districts 
within metropolitan areas,” including disparities in the quality of education provided).  
151. Black, Charter Schools, supra note 3, at 1736–37. 
152. To be sure, in order for students to even take advantage of market-based reforms, it
requires that they or their parents have the social capital that it takes to navigate what is often a 
byzantine process of applying for charters, vouchers, or school choice programs. See, e.g., 
Conor Williams, What Applying to Charter Schools Showed Me About Inequality, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/03/what-
applying-to-charter-schools-showed-me-about-inequality/284530/ (describing how parents with 
more time and resources can increase their chances of obtaining a coveted spot in the charter 
school lottery by applying to more schools and having the ability to stand in line early in the 
morning to submit charter applications). 
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providing a quality education to students, particularly poor and 
minority students. Put another way, market based reforms allow the 
state to essentially turn over responsibility for providing a quality 
public education to parents and students under the guise that parental 
choice that results in a few select students improving the education 
they receive is the same as offering quality public education that 
benefits the collective good. Poor and minority students whose 
parents lack the social capital to navigate the system of school choice 
often suffer the most from the state retrenchment of providing 
wholesale quality public education.
153
  
In sum, market-based reforms focus on the individual rather than 
collective benefits of public education. They also shift the 
responsibility for obtaining a quality public education from the state 
to students and parents. As a result, quality public education is now in 
many ways an excludable good distributed through private-market 
like exchanges. This in turn results in public education being situated 
closer to a private good than a public good. As discussed in the part 
that follows, situating a quality public education as a private good has 
implications for how we normatively conceptualize public education 
that in turn leads to distributional inequalities that harm poor and 
minority students.  
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF QUALITY PUBLIC EDUCATION AS A
PRIVATE GOOD 
A. Normative Shift in Our Conceptualization of Public Education
An important consequence of market-based reforms is that they 
are causing a seismic shift in the ways in which public education is 
normatively conceptualized. Throughout the history of public 
education in America, two competing normative justifications for 
public education have existed, the first rooted in principles of 
democracy and the second rooted in principles related to social 
153. See, e.g., Valerie Lee, Educational Choices: The Stratifying Effect of Selecting 
Schools and Courses, 2 EDUC. POL’Y 125, 137–38 (June 1993) (noting that there is little 
evidence to suggest that low quality schools close down as advocates of school choice suggest 
but that instead low quality schools remain and continue to serve the students whose parents 
lacked the motivation or interest in choosing a higher quality school).  
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mobility or social advantage.
154
 As described in the parts that follow, 
situating public education as a private rather than public good 
diminishes the democracy-related justifications for public education 
and allows the social mobility justification for public education to 
dominate. Such a shift in our normative conception of the 
justification for public education causes harm to the most vulnerable: 
poor and minority students.  
1. Democracy Rationale
For much of the history of American public education, the 
democracy rationale for public education played a larger role than the 
social mobility justification.
155
 For example, during the American 
colonial period, public education was seen as necessary in order to 
indoctrinate residents with religious principles so that they would be 
less inclined towards barbarianism and social disorder.
156
 Indeed, one 
of the first pieces of education-related legislation during this period, 
the Massachusetts Bay School Law, indicated that people must be 
taught to read and write so that they could “obey the laws of God and 
the state.”157 Several other laws enacted in colonial Massachusetts 
mandating some form of public school for segments of the population 
often emphasized that “the good education of children is of singular 
benefit to any common-wealth”158 and the importance of ensuring 
children’s ability “to read and understand the principles of 
religion.”159  
The vision of education as being necessary for the health of the 
democracy was most prevalent at the start of the 1800s.
160
 At that 
time, it was widely believed that an educated citizenry would allow 
154. David F. Labaree, Consuming the Public School, 61 EDUC. THEORY 381 (2011) 
[hereinafter Labaree, Consuming]. 
155. See id. 
156. Id. at 382. 
157. See THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY 68–69 (T.B. Wait & Co. 1814). 
158. See Marcus W. Jernegan, Compulsory Education in the American Colonies: I. New 
England, 26 SCHOOL REV. 731, 740 n.I (1918). 
159. See 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW 
ENGLAND 6 (Nathanial B. Shurtleff, M.D. ed., Press of William White 1853). 
160. Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, The Post-Parents Involved Challenge: Confronting 
Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, 1034–35 (2008). 
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citizens to cast informed votes and to participate knowingly and 
effectively in the democracy.
161
 To that end, the state established 
compulsory education laws and provided citizens with free 
education.
162
 Common school founders such as Horace Mann 
envisioned public education as providing crucial citizenship training 
functions because they believed that an effective democracy required 
citizens with proper civic virtue.
163
 Common school founders also 
believed that public education could provide citizens with a 
“common culture and a sense of shared membership in the 
community.”164 The common culture and shared sense membership 
was seen as necessary to prevent class conflict that was arising from 
the growth of capitalism. In that vein, common school founders 
believed that public education could serve as the “great equalizer” of 
men.
165
 Thus, the common school founders situated education as 
benefiting the public through citizen training and ensuring that all 
citizens were equally educated in order to avoid class conflict.
166
 
161. Id. 
162. PATRICK J. RYAN, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN AMERICA 
256 (1965) (noting that during the 1800s and early 1900s, public education was made available 
at no cost by all states. The chief reason compelling the provision of free public education was 
that it was seen as undemocratic to require students to pay since “education for citizenship in a 
republic was not only a vested right of the individual but also a social obligation”); ALLAN S. 
HORLICK, PATRICIANS, PROFESSORS, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN 
EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 15 (1994). 
163. See David F. Labaree, Public Goods, Private Goods: The American Struggle Over 
Educational Goals, 34 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 39, 44 (1997) (explaining that early common school 
reformers saw citizen training as a key reason to provide public education and quoting Horace 
Mann as saying “it is a very laborious thing to make Republicans; and woe to the republic that 
rests upon no better foundations than ignorance, selfishness, and passion”) [hereinafter Labaree, 
Public Goods].  
164. Id. at 45.
165. See Horace Mann, Report for 1848, in ANNUAL REPORTS ON EDUCATION 668–69 
(1872) (“Now, surely nothing but universal education can counterwork this tendency to the 
domination of capital and the servility of labor. If one class possesses all the wealth and the 
education, while the residue of society is ignorant and poor, it matters not by what name the 
relation between them may be called: the latter, in fact and in truth, will be the servile 
dependents and subjects of the former. But, if education be equably diffused, it will draw 
property after it by the strongest of all attractions. . . . Education then, beyond all other devices 
of human origin, is a great equalizer of the conditions of men—the balance wheel of the social 
machinery.”). 
166. See Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 44–45; Frankenberg & Le, supra note 
160, at 1034–37. Notably, the common school founders’ vision of equally educating all citizens 
did not apply to all demographics of the citizenry. Instead, the vision was limited to “a select 
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2. Social Mobility Rationale
The “social mobility” or “social advantage” normative 
justification for public education also existed but came to particular 
prominence during the late 1800s. At that time, a group of education 
reformers led by elite members of society believed that “education 
had to be made appropriate to life chances”167 and to prepare 
“students for their future social roles.”168 The impetus behind this 
change was the development of the industrial economy and the desire 
for elites to maintain their place of privilege within the industrial 
economy.
169
  
Elitist educational reformers pushed for a more stratified system 
of public education with varying skills being taught to different 
students, rather than the universal curriculum advocated by the 
common school founders.
170
 The stratified system of education 
required students to “climb upward through a sequence of grade 
levels and graded institutions and to face an increasing risk of 
elimination as they approach the higher levels of the system.”171 
Those who were able to navigate their way through the stratified 
system of education were able to obtain more credentials, which 
allowed them to obtain better jobs and a higher social status.
172
 This 
group of those residing in the U.S., namely white, male landowners.” FRANKENBERG ET AL., 
supra note 124, at 1034.  
167. HORLICK, supra note 162, at 3, 10–22.
168. Labaree, Consuming, supra note 154, at 385. 
169. HORLICK, supra note 162, at 51–54 (contrasting the views of the common school 
founders who believed that universal education was necessary in order to enhance the 
intellectual and moral level of all Americans in order to make a make a more effective republic, 
with the elitist education reformist of the late 1800s/early 1900s who believed that a social and 
cultural elite was necessary to give direction to society. Elitist education reformers believed that 
the industrial economy which was characterized by “tremendous capacity for productive output 
and frightening confrontations between capital and labor” which lead to high rates of social 
mobility. The elites believed that stratification in the skills taught would help them to maintain 
their privileged place in society).  
170. HORLICK, supra note 162, at 10–22. See also Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, 
at 51 (commenting that “[t]he last thing that a socially mobile educational consumer wants out 
of education is the kind of equal educational outcome produced in the name of democratic 
equality”). 
171. Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 52. 
172. See Labaree, Consuming, supra note 154, at 390–92 (arguing that elitist education 
reformers “turned the common school, where everyone underwent the same educational 
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stratified system of education favored (and continues to favor) elites 
because of the privileged station from which they began.
173
  
To be sure, these two visions of public education—education for 
the health of the democracy and education for purposes of individual 
social mobility—are contrasting visions. The view of education as 
necessary for the health of the democracy situates education as a 
public good—or a good “where benefits are enjoyed by all members 
of the community, whether or not they actually contributed to the 
production of the good.”174 As a result, the individual social mobility 
rationale suggests that education is private property and that 
excluding people from consuming it can assist the individual in 
differentiating themselves and moving-up the social and class 
ladders.  
While the democracy and social mobility rationales are 
contrasting they have until recently co-existed with one another.
175
 
However, the normative justifications for providing public education 
have slowly been re-conceptualized through market-based reforms to 
public education such that the vision of public education for social 
mobility purposes dominates the vision of public education for the 
health of the democracy.
176
 This shift is explored in the part that 
follows.  
experience, into the uncommon school where everyone entered the same institution but then 
pursued different programs”).  
173. Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 52 (quoting RUSSELL COLLINS, THE
CREDENTIAL SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND STRATIFICATION 183 
(Academic Press 1979) (“As education has become more available, the children of higher social 
classes have increased their schooling in the same proportions as children of the lower social 
classes have increased theirs; hence the ratios of relative educational attainment by social 
classes [remain] constant.”)). 
174. Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 51. 
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Frankenberg & Le, supra note 160, at 1036–37 (“Originally conceived as a 
system of ‘common schools’ that teach civics and citizenship and that are supposed to erase 
inequality, many now perceive that public schools serve essentially as college prep schools and 
the center of elite, merit-based learning that ‘separate the wheat from the chaff,’ and as a means 
for private advancement.”); Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 73 (“[T]he increasing 
hegemony of the mobility goal and its narrow consumer-based approach to education have led 
to the reconceptualization of education as a purely private good.”).  
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B. Market-Based Reforms Allow the Social Mobility Justification for
Public Education to Dominate 
The social mobility justification for public education suggests that 
the purpose of public schools is to “provide students with the 
educational credentials they need in order to get ahead.”177 Put 
another way, it envisions public education as necessary in order to 
provide individuals with a vehicle they can use to obtain economic 
security. Though the social mobility justification for public education 
has always existed, it became particularly acute and dominant when 
the American economy shifted from a manufacturing-based to a 
knowledge-based one.
178
 This is the case because the manufacturing 
economy, for the most part, required its workers to possess very 
highly specialized skills that were specific to different manufacturing 
industries and could be taught on the job.
179
 As a result, only a 
general high school diploma, not a post-secondary education, was 
necessary in order to obtain a well-paying job that would allow a 
person to maintain a middle-class lifestyle.
180
  
In the new knowledge-based economy on the other hand, 
“knowledge is a commodity that when exploited can reap tangible 
benefits upon the possessor.”181 In particular, the kind of knowledge 
that is necessary in order to obtain most jobs, particularly well-paying 
ones, in the new knowledge-based economy is a college or advanced 
degree.
182
 To that end, the number of people with at least some 
177. Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 50. 
178. See generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, REVISITED
(2012) (arguing that a creative class composed of scientists, technologists, innovators and other 
knowledge based professionals had become the central force in the American economy 
propelling economic growth).  
179. ANTHONY CARNEVALE & DONNA DESROCHERS, OFFICE OF VOCATIONAL AND ADULT
EDUC., THE MISSING MIDDLE: ALIGNING EDUCATION AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 1 (Apr. 
4, 2002), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED465092.pdf.  
180. Id. at 5 (describing the types of and availability of jobs in the manufacturing-based 
economy and noting that during that time period “people could start at the bottom and, without 
much formal education, work their way to the top” without much formal education). 
181. Aaron N. Taylor, “Your Results May Vary”: Protecting Students and Taxpayers 
Through Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 729, 
744 (2010).  
182. CARNEVALE & DESROCHERS, supra note 179, at 6 (describing the change in the 
education level required to obtain a job in the knowledge based economy and noting that the bar 
is set particularly high with most jobs requiring some college or a bachelor’s degree).  
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college or a college degree has increased substantially.
183
 As a result, 
it is becoming increasingly important in the new knowledge based 
economy for individuals to not only have college experience or a 
degree, but to obtain that degree from a highly regarded college or 
university.
184
 This has in turn led to college admission at all levels, 
but especially the most elite colleges, becoming increasingly 
competitive.
185
 
The aforementioned shift in the kinds of education necessary to 
obtain economic security and social mobility in the new knowledge-
based economy is having a profound impact on elementary and 
secondary public education in America. Indeed, because of the 
importance of a college degree to the new knowledge-based 
economy, public elementary and secondary schools are increasingly 
conceptualized as necessary launching pads to help students get into 
the best colleges and universities.
186
 As a result, not all public schools 
are created equally; rather there is intentional stratification amongst 
public schools.  
183. Catherine Rampell, Data Reveal a Rise in College Degrees Among Americans, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/13/education/a-sharp-rise-in-americans-
with-college-degrees.html?_r=0 (noting the increasing number of Americans with a college 
degree and finding that “college attendance has increased in the past decade partly because of 
the new types of jobs that have been created in the digital age, which have increased the wage 
gap between degree holders and everyone else”). 
184. See Kevin Carey, Gaps in Earnings Stand Out in Release of College Data, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/14/upshot/gaps-in-alumni-earnings-
stand-out-in-release-of-college-data.html (finding that “students who enroll in wealthy, elite 
colleges earn more than those who do not”); Jordan Weissmann, Does It Matter Where You go 
to College?, THE ATLANTIC (May 17, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2012/05/does-it-matter-where-you-go-to-college/257227/ (analyzing data showing a correlation 
between college and prestige and future earnings). 
185. Nick Anderson, Ivy League Admission Rate: 8-Point-Something Percent, WASH.
POST. (Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/the-ivy-league-
admission-rate-8-point-something-something-percent/2014/03/28/558400de-b67e-11e3-8cc3-
d4bf596577eb_story.html (reporting that the admission rate for the elite Ivy League schools 
was approximately 8.9%).  
186. While the subject of this Article is public schools, private schools also play a role in 
conceptualizing the purpose of education more broadly as being for social mobility purposes. In 
fact, affluent students who do not attend well-regarded public schools instead attend private 
elementary and secondary schools that have selective admissions processes and charge tuition 
rates that approximate or rival the tuition rate at selective colleges. See generally Anna Bahr, 
When Getting Into College Starts at 3, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/07/30/upshot/when-the-college-admissions-battle-starts-at-age-3.html.  
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Stratification is not only deemed appropriate but necessary if the 
purpose of public education is conceptualized as providing students 
with the credentials they need to “get ahead” in the knowledge based 
economy. When social mobility is the primary goal of public 
education “[t]he benefits of education are understood to be selective 
and differential rather than collective and equal.”187 That leads to 
public education being “structured in such a manner that the social 
benefits of education are allocated differently, with some students 
receiving more than others.”188 Put another way, schools are 
differentiated so that some students will be able to obtain an 
education that sets them apart from others and gives them a credential 
that makes them more attractive than another student, particularly in 
the quest for admission to selective colleges.  
Market-based reforms exploit this differentiated system of 
education by requiring students to fight for admittance into the 
limited number of quality charter, magnet schools or voucher 
programs and not enacting reforms to schools that improve all 
schools. For poor and minority students who are often locked into 
neighborhoods where the traditional public schools are low quality, 
market-based reforms do not offer a meaningful opportunity for the 
majority of such students to obtain a quality education. Yet, they are 
allowed to serve as the predominate form of public school reform 
because we now conceptualize public education as a private rather 
than public good that is primarily necessary for social mobility 
purposes. To that end, there must be winners and losers in the race 
for quality public education. Given the vulnerable status of poor and 
minority students, they often become the losers. To be sure, market-
based reforms are not all bad and should not be discounted altogether. 
However, they must not be permitted to remain the sole basis of 
public school reform. The part that follows outlines important public 
school reform alternatives that could be enacted along with market-
based reforms in order to shift public education back to being a 
public good.  
187. Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 51. 
188. Id. at 52.
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IV. EXPANDING THE REFORM AGENDA: ALTERNATIVES TO MARKET-
BASED REFORMS 
The decline of judicially-based remedies as a means of improving 
educational opportunities for poor and minority students is 
understandable given the limitations discussed in Part I. However, the 
saturation of the reform agenda with primarily market-based reforms 
is misguided. The primarily market-based reform agenda has a 
detrimental impact on the educational opportunities available to poor 
and minority student because it results in a quality education being 
conceptualized as a private good. As with most private goods, the 
most vulnerable members of society—in this case poor and minority 
students—have a difficult time obtaining it. Given the positive 
externalities associated with a quality public education, it is important 
that measures be taken to ensure that a quality public education 
remains a public, not a private good. To that end, this part provides a 
non-exhaustive summary of two expansive potential reforms that 
could be enacted in greater scope alongside market-based reforms in 
order to ensure that a quality public education remains a public good.  
First, a primary reason that poor and minority students are unable 
to obtain access to a quality education is because residence is linked 
with school assignment.
189
 Market-based reforms change this 
paradigm for a shallow subset of poor and minority students who are 
able to use the reforms to get into a quality school outside of their 
neighborhood school. The limited scope of these reforms, however, 
makes them an insufficient reform remedy. An alternative reform 
measure would be to enact reforms that allow for more inter-district 
mobility. Because of the high levels of racial and economic 
segregation between districts, and the harms associated with racially 
and economically segregated schools, reform that tightly links school 
attendance with residence is critical. Enacting some forms of 
regionalism in public school assignments would help to dislodge the 
current monopoly that more affluent and typically white students 
have on quality public education.
190
  
189. Wilson, Leveling Localism, supra note 8, at 645–49; Aaron Saiger, The School 
District Boundary Line Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 501–07 (2010). 
190. See Wilson, Regionalism, supra note 39, at 1465–68 (describing successful forms of 
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In addition to regionalism, another type of reform that could be 
enacted to lessen the connection between residence and school 
attendance is controlled choice. Controlled choice is a system of 
school assignment in which “rather than assign[ing] students to a 
zoned neighborhood school, controlled choice allows parents to rank 
their school preferences across a district—and then uses a computer 
algorithm to balance those choices to achieve a diverse mix of 
students in each school.”191 Successful controlled choice programs 
have been enacted in places like Wake County, North Carolina; 
Cambridge, Massachusetts; and San Francisco, California.
192
 
Enacting programs that delink residence from school attendance 
through regionalism or controlled choice would broaden the ability of 
all children to obtain a quality public education thereby situating a 
quality public education closer to that of a public rather than private 
good.  
Second, as other scholars have noted, most low-performing 
schools in urban areas are low-performing because, among other 
things, students and their families are dealing with a plethora of non-
school issues that make learning difficult.
193
 A better alternative 
might be to replace low-performing schools with Community Based 
Schools (CBS). CBSs are schools that partner with other public 
service providers to provide not just educational services, but also 
much needed support to distressed communities in areas such as 
health care, counseling, adult education, and cultural events.
194
 For 
regionalist education governance structures that have been enacted); ORFIELD & 
FRANKENBERG, supra note 25, at 35 (arguing for expansion of regionalism in public education 
as a reform that would vastly improve educational opportunities for poor and minority 
students).  
191. Brad Lander & Ritchie Torres, What Would It Take to Integrate Our Schools, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/opinion/what-would-it-take-to-
integrate-our-schools.html?_r=0.  
192. See Eric Schulzke, ‘Controlled Choice’: Does Mixing Kids Based on Family Income 
Improve Education, DESERT NAT’L NEWS (Apr. 10, 2014), http://national.deseretnews.com/ 
article/1265/controlled-choice-does-mixing-kids-based-on-family-income-improve-education. 
html.  
193. See, e.g., Black, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 1759–60. 
194. See, e.g., What Is a Community School?, COALITION FOR COMMUNITY SCHS.
http://www.communityschools.org/aboutschools/what_is_a_community_school.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2015) (describing community schools as a “place and set of partnerships 
between the school and other community resources” and noting that community schools “bring 
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example, in Cincinnati, Ohio, the Cincinnati School District 
revamped its failing schools with CBSs called “community learning 
centers.”195 The community learning centers in Cincinnati have 
shown modest but important progress. Improved graduation rates, test 
scores, attendance, and community revitalization have been a 
hallmark of the community learning center expansion in 
Cincinnati.
196
 Some forms of CBSs have been successfully 
implemented in other high poverty urban school systems.
197
 A reform 
agenda that includes CBSs would assist in re-conceptualizing a 
quality public education as a public good rather than a private good.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that market-based reforms as the primary 
method of reforming schools for poor and minority students situates a 
quality education as a private good rather than a public good. It 
suggests that they do so through their emphasis on the individual 
rather than collective benefits of public education and by putting the 
onus on individual parents and students rather than the state to 
provide a quality education. It further suggests that the enactment of 
wholesale market-based reforms results in social mobility rather than 
democratic values being normatively conceptualized as the primary 
together many partners to offer a range of supports and opportunities to children, youth, 
families and communities”). 
195. Bylaws & Policies § 7500, CINCINNATI CITY SCH. DIST, http://community.cps-k12. 
org/sites/boardpolicies/7000%20Property/7500%20Policy%20Community%20Learning%20 
Centers.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (“[E]ach school should also be a community learning 
center in which a variety of partners shall offer academic programs, enrichment activities, and 
support to students, families, and community members before and after school as well as during 
the evenings and on weekends throughout the calendar year.”). 
196. See Javier C. Hernández, Mayoral Candidates See Cincinnati as a Model for New 
York Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/nyregion/ 
candidates-see-cincinnati-as-model-for-new-york-schools.html?_r=0 (“[A]fter years of poor 
performance and an exodus of middle-class families to the suburbs, Cincinnati has made some 
of the greatest gains in test scores in Ohio in recent years, even though it lags behind state 
averages. School officials here credit the city’s embrace of the community-schools model, 
which is now fully in place in 34 of 55 schools in the system.”). 
197. Community School—Results that Turn Around Failing Schools: Test Scores, 
Attendance, Graduation and College-Going Rates, COALITION FOR COMMUNITY SCHS. 2 (May 
2010), http://www.communityschools.org/assets/1/AssetManager/Turning_Around_Schools_ 
CS_Results2.pdf (describing successful implementation of community schools in New York, 
New York; Providence, Rhode Island; and Tukwila, Washington). 
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purpose of public education. This results in a stratified system of 
public education which is normatively considered appropriate but 
operates to the disadvantage of poor and minority students. In order 
to re-conceptualize public education as public rather than private 
good, the Article proposes enacting reforms that decouple school 
attendance from residence through regionalism and controlled choice. 
It also proposes enacting reforms such as community-based schools 
that actually improve neighborhood schools located in predominately 
poor and minority areas. Enacting such reforms, in addition to 
market-based reforms, will help to ensure that a quality public 
education remains a public rather than private good.
